Analysis: Russia, Iran strengthen alliance after Syria setback

Iran and Russia have finalised a long-delayed cooperation agreement, reinforcing ties between the two countries just as they both face mounting geopolitical pressures.

The 20-year deal, signed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Friday, enhances military and defence cooperation, and includes a clause that neither country would allow its territory to be used for any action that would threaten the safety of the other, nor provide any help to any party attacking either country.

Such a deal has been talked about for years, but current events have made the need for an agreement more pressing.

For Russia, the war in Ukraine has strained its geopolitical standing, while Iran, in addition to Moscow, has been grappling with Western sanctions and the fallout from Israel’s attacks on and weakening of several of its allies in the region, as well as the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in early December.

It is arguably Syria that has provided the key impetus to the strengthening of ties, with both powers losing a key ally in al-Assad, weakening their power in the wider Middle East.

Both Moscow and Tehran were eventually willing to let go of al-Assad, having been caught off-guard by the opposition advance. But they now appear committed to strengthening their own bilateral relationship.

The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement during Pezeshkian’s official visit to Moscow reflects that.

The agreement builds not only on Russian-Iranian cooperation regarding Ukraine and efforts to evade Western sanctions, but also on the North-South Transport Corridor – an initiative championed by Moscow to facilitate trade from Asia to Russia.

This route, designed to bypass geopolitical choke points like the Suez Canal and the Baltics, favours a land corridor through Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea.

Syria as a catalyst

Prior to the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011, both Moscow and Tehran had their own respective strategic partnerships with Damascus.

Russia’s partnership was anchored to the naval base in Tartous, established in 1971 to project power across the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim airbase, built in 2015 initially to provide air support to al-Assad against the Syrian opposition. Over time, the airbase has played a pivotal role in Moscow’s operations in Africa.

Iran, meanwhile, deepened its relations during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, driven by an understanding that both Tehran and Damascus opposed Western interference in the region. Syria became an important conduit to the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah, part of Iran’s “Shia crescent” and “axis of resistance”.

Iranian and Russian strategic interests converged in Syria as the war progressed, particularly in 2015, when both stepped in forcefully to prevent an opposition victory.

Russia’s military intervention in 2015 stabilised al-Assad’s regime, aided by Iranian-aligned militias that played a decisive role in turning the tide of the conflict.

“Relations between Russia and Iran have since expanded,” Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, told Al Jazeera. “After 2020, events in Syria had only a minor impact on Russian-Iranian relations, which have developed in many new directions.”

These include military cooperation, and an expansion of economic ties, with Tehran and Moscow working to bypass Western sanctions through alternative banking mechanisms and energy deals. Iran has also positioned itself as a critical transit hub for Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor, offering a vital trade route to Asia.

Ties have also deepened since the Russia-Ukraine war, in which Russia is using Iranian-supplied drones, driven by shared interests in confronting the perceived global hegemony of the United States. Both countries seek alternatives to the US-led global order, with Iran viewing Russia as a partner in its pivot towards the East.

Iran joining the BRICS group of emerging economies in 2023, a club Russia was already a part of, can be viewed as part of this effort. BRICS offers a platform for collaboration, as Iran eyes membership and integration into a multipolar economic bloc aligned with its goals.

“Building a multipolar world and countering the expansionist plans of the United States and the collective West remain central to Russian-Iranian cooperation,” Semenov said.

It is this common enemy approach that has seen Iran and Russia grow closer, said Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs.

“The two sides have taken steps to elevate their relationship toward some sort of strategic partnership, particularly in areas like military and security cooperation, and more recently in economic cooperation, aimed at evading sanctions and adapting to the negative implications of economic pressures from the West,” said Azizi.

Limits to a Russian-Iranian partnership

While the cooperation pact signed on Friday signals a deepening partnership, it does not include a mutual defence clause or constitute the formation of a formal alliance, unlike the treaty Russia signed with North Korea last year.

That perhaps reflects a limit to the relationship between Iran and Russia that has already been seen in Syria.

There, Tehran and Moscow could not find common ground and were more often than not undermining each other or unable to rise to the challenge of rebuilding the country.

For example, in 2017, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin made it clear his country would be the only one to rebuild Syria’s energy industry. Iran, which was eager to reap the benefits of reconstruction in Syria, was kept at bay by al-Assad and Moscow with one Iranian parliamentarian warning that Iran was being “sacrificed”.

The new Syrian administration may also become a point of divergence between Russia and Iran, with Moscow maintaining a more conciliatory approach.

Azizi noted that the fallout from al-Assad’s fall for both Russia and Iran will depend on numerous variables, including “whether or not there has been some behind-the-scenes agreement or understanding between Russia on one side and the US, Turkiye, and [the former] Syrian rebels on the other, as part of a potential comprehensive package that includes Syria and Ukraine”.

“For example, if Russia can maintain its military bases in Syria, albeit in a more reduced capacity, and if there is an agreement to end the war in Ukraine after [US President-elect] Donald Trump takes office, Russia may actually feel less need for Iranian support on various fronts in both Syria and Ukraine,” Azizi added, although he added that he believed any fundamental changes in Iran-Russia relations were unlikely given the “increasing depth of cooperation” in the past few years.

Divergence is possible in other areas too, particularly on the topic of nuclear weapons, which Iran has been accused by the West of seeking. Iran’s defence doctrine officially opposes the pursuit of nuclear weapons, but some factions in Iran have now publicly called for that to change after Israel landed several blows to its allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Russia has historically been involved in Iran’s nuclear programme, including in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but repeatedly stalled progress throughout the 2000s and 2010s, leaving some in Iran to accuse Russia of being an unreliable partner. Moscow also delayed the delivery of the S-300 missile defence system between 2010 and 2016, a result of the sanctions placed on Tehran by Western nations.

“Russia doesn’t want Iran to be equipped with nuclear weapons … [that] would change the balance of power in the Middle East against Russia’s interests. The best scenario for Russia is for Iran to remain under sanctions and to challenge the US and Europe over its nuclear programme,” said Armin Montazeri, foreign policy editor at Hammihan Daily in Tehran.

“If Russia were to cooperate in containing Iran, it would likely seek concessions from the US on the Ukraine issue,” Montazeri added.

New directions in the Middle East

Geopolitical dynamics can always change depending on events on the ground, as Syria has proven, and with the lack of any strong ideological bonds beyond an anti-US strategy, relations between Iran and Russia could fray.

The changing nature of alliances can be seen in Turkiye’s opposition to Iran and Russia, and its cooperation with them.

In December 2024, as the Assad regime crumbled, the Turkish, Iranian, and Russian foreign ministers convened on the sidelines of the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The tripartite meeting was convened under the Astana process, a diplomatic initiative aimed at managing the Syrian conflict, where Russia and Iran had served as guarantors on the regime side and Turkiye on the opposition’s.

Astana served as an opportunity for the three powers to work together to achieve security goals in Syria, even as they supported different sides. But for most of the process, it was Turkiye that was in the weaker position, considering what was seen as al-Assad’s de facto victory in the war.

That has now changed, and it is Turkiye’s longstanding support for the former opposition that places it in a position of power vis-a-vis Iran and Russia, and a conduit for influence on Damascus.

It is a new reality that they are going to have to adapt to, said Omer Ozkizilcik, director of Turkish Studies at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul.

“Iran, while clearly disadvantaged, will have to adjust to the new reality and establish some form of relationship with Syria’s new government,” said Ozkizilcik, referring to the almost carte blanche the Assad regime gave Iran to operate within Syrian territory.

For its part, Russia, while hoping to keep its bases in Syria, is hedging the new reality by turning partially to Libya, where it has a close relationship with the eastern government based in Benghazi and Russian cargo planes have made several flights to its al-Khadim base.

Iran, on the other hand, has seemingly retreated to Iraq in a bid to consolidate its position. Reports have emerged that it has pushed its allies in Iraq to stop firing rockets and drones towards Israel, which may have led to US-Israeli attacks on their positions.

In this context, Iran is likely to shore up its influence in Iraq, “the last pillars of Iran’s axis of resistance,” said Montazeri.

Iraq’s importance now serves as a financial resource and defensive buffer for Tehran, which relies on the country for economic support amid sanctions.

Seyed Emamian, co-founder of the Governance and Policy think tank in Tehran, said Iran has a history of adapting to shifting geopolitical dynamics, and will be able to withstand any changes and maintain its relationship with Russia.

Yet whatever deals emerge between Russia and the US following Trump’s inauguration, Iran’s leadership does not expect Putin to radically alter his strategic direction towards Iran.

“Putin is well aware of the anti-Russian stance embedded in the US and European establishments,” Emamian said.

“Over the last three years, Russia has faced what it perceives as an existential challenge from the West … it seems unlikely that Putin would risk his longstanding alliances, especially with those who have proven their loyalty in critical moments, such as in Syria and Crimea,” Emamian added.

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